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Are humans basically self-centered, aggressive animals with
only a thin coating of moral varnish? Or is our morality in
our genes, part of our genetic inheritance? If so, do we find
traces of morally induced behavior in our nearest relatives,
the apes?
These questions have fascinated primatologist Frans de
Waal most of his professional life, and they have been at the
core of his many popular books. Primates and Philosophers
grew out of his Tanner Lectures at Princeton University and
so has a peculiar structure. It includes essays by four scholars
in response to the lectures (and sometimes to de Waal’s other
books) and closes with the author’s response to the com-
mentators. Here I discuss features of de Waal’s main thesis
that are within my purview as an environmental historian
with an interest in wild animals.
De Waal argues that humans are moral animals, a com-
monality we have, at least up to a point, with chimpanzees
and bonobos, which are, evolutionarily speaking, our nearest
relatives and which de Waal has studied for decades in zoos.
He bases his arguments on this research and on a growing
body of observational data from other scientists who have
studied great apes in the wild in Africa. Readers interested in
more details than de Waal’s relatively short essay (80 pages)
can provide are referred to his Good Natured (1996) and Our
Inner Ape (2005).
In de Waal’s view, it is plausible that the common ancestor
of humans, bonobos, and chimps was a “moral” being in the
sense that it may have shown altruistic and empathic features
like the ones we find in those species today. Finding moral
features in apes is a fairly recent phenomenon that has rev-
olutionized our view of these animals and, in some eyes, of
ourselves.
What kind of evidence would a historian require before
entertaining such a hypothesis? He or she would note that it
was 5.5 million years ago that hominids branched off from
that ancestor and that it is therefore extremely unlikely that
we will find any direct evidence for or against de Waal’s hy-
pothesis. We may find evidence of how our common ancestor
dealt with its natural environment or what it ate, but we will
probably not learn much more about its behavior patterns.
We can also be sure that humans have evolved in the past
5.5 million years. New evolutionary roads may have been
opened by the development of speech and the ability to make
fire, two factors that must have changed early humans’ way
of life drastically and may therefore have had some bearing
on the types of behavior that were at a premium, with all the
moral implications that such changes might have entailed.
Climate change also must have led to shifts in human be-
havior, not once but several times over the last million years.
Rising or falling average temperatures and sea levels were
surely challenges that must have led to new patterns of evo-
lutionary selection among hominids.
It should also be pointed out that the present-day behavior
of apes is not necessarily the same as that of a few million
years ago. If people have evolved, then so have apes. Philos-
ophers have denied “brute beasts” a history because they have
no annals or empires, but that does not mean that chimpan-
zees’ present-day behavior and morals can be projected back-
ward unchanged a few million years. They and other apes
have been subject to selective evolutionary pressures that were
partly the same ones that humans were confronted with (e.g.,
climate change).
Of course, what applies to our common ancestor is also
true for the hominids and apes of a few million years ago;
we have some of their bones and implements and some re-
mainders of their kills, but direct information regarding their
behavioral patterns will probably never be available. Direct
knowledge of human behavioral patterns from written texts
is not older than a few millennia (e.g., the Vedas, the Gil-
gamesh epic, the Bible, Homer), so the gulf between our
earliest knowledge of human morality and the knowledge
required for testing de Waal’s hypothesis is vast.
The same type of knowledge regarding animal behavior is
even more recent. Behavioral studies, either in zoos or in the
wild, are largely a post–World War II phenomenon. There is
some older information, in some cases dating back a few
millennia (e.g., Herodotus, Aristotle), but this is mainly an-
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ecdotal evidence of uncertain provenance and reliability, and
it appears, moreover, to be largely restricted to just a few
animals that captured the imagination of the ancients. So the
gulf is even wider here.
De Waal is aware of most of these problems, but he does
not mention them in Primates and Philosophers. In Our Inner
Ape, he dedicated only a few lines to the problems posed by
our lack of knowledge regarding the ancestors of humans and
apes and the evolutionary processes that have taken place
since they lived. Philip Kitcher (particularly on pp. 136–39)
is aware of the fact that we should be dealing with humans
(and apes) of long ago and not with our contemporaries if
we want to test de Waal’s statements. Historians do not nec-
essarily have to disagree with de Waal. On the contrary, he
makes a plausible case for his hypothesis, but, given the ab-
sence of historical evidence, it can be based only on a number
of rather heroic assumptions.
Finally, de Waal has strongly suggested in his publications
that seeing nonhuman animals—in this case, two species of
apes—as moral beings is a novel concept, and his critics in
this volume do not contest this. He emphasizes that philos-
ophers and other scholars—and perhaps people in general—
have always stressed the differences between amoral or im-
moral beasts and moral humans. However, human perception
of the “closeness” between people and animals is not a con-
stant. In early modern Europe there were always people—
both laymen and scholars—who believed that people and
(some) animals were close, so close, for instance, that they
could mate and produce offspring. It was also not rare to
ascribe religious feelings and thus morality to certain animals
(see, e.g., Thomas 1983). Perhaps the most conspicuous ex-
ample of attributing moral qualities to animals is found in
late-medieval trials of animals, such as pigs, that had trans-
gressed seriously against people (e.g., Cohen 1986).
Primates and Philosophers discusses the moral side of animal
behavior and its implications for the importance of morality
in human nature. Those who are mainly interested in the
philosophical aspects of de Waal’s discussion should read this
book. Everyone else is better off with books like Our Inner
Ape.
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More than a century after Huxley’s (1989) controversial lec-
ture “Evolution and Ethics,” he is still reviled by some as a
traitor to the cause of Darwinism. Toward the end of his life,
it is said, Huxley got weak knees and extracted man from
nature, where Darwin had courageously put him. Huxley
thought that man counteracted the brutality of evolution with
ethics, limiting what for Darwin had been a universal process.
So harsh were the critics, including former friend Herbert
Spencer, that Huxley was moved to write a “Prolegomena”
in which he defended his views, pledged his allegiance to
Darwinism, and bewailed the fact that people had thought
him anti-Darwinian.
Frans de Waal remains unconvinced. Huxley, writes de Waal
in Primates and Philosophers, was a useful proselytizer but
never really understood the theory of evolution. De Waal
makes him the figurehead of a school of thought that believes
that evil resides in nature and that we are good only to the
extent that we divorce ourselves from nature. The Huxleyans,
as de Waal calls them, see morality as a thin, cultural veneer
over amoral human nature. Homo homini lupus, and the beast
within can be chained only by a social contract, a culturally
imposed superego, or an act of free will, as when Richard
Dawkins assured us that “we, alone on earth, can rebel against
the tyranny of the selfish replicators” (p. 9). Veneer theory is
surprisingly popular among de Waal’s own colleagues. It was
a sociobiologist, Michael Ghiselin, who produced its best and
briefest summary: “scratch an ‘altruist’ and watch a ‘hypocrite’
bleed” (p. 10).
Huxley’s “curious dualism” (p. 8) in “Evolution and Ethics”
is astounding, writes de Waal. The erstwhile defender of Dar-
winism was in effect saying that what makes us human, our
morality, cannot be explained by evolutionary theory. Not
only was this an “inexplicable retreat” (p. 8) but Huxley “gave
no hint whatsoever where humanity might have unearthed
the strength and will to defeat the forces of its own nature”
(p. 8). It would indeed have been astounding had Huxley
really retreated from Darwinism, but he never did. De Waal
is wrong, and his indignation is misguided. In fact, Huxley’s
reflections on human morality are still relevant today and are
in some ways more subtle than de Waal’s.
What makes de Waal’s attitude toward Huxley especially
disagreeable is the fact that Huxley gave more than a hint as
to where people find the strength to oppose their own nature.
In the “Prolegomena,” he assured his critics that morality is
an evolved trait like any other. The roots of the “ethical pro-
cess” lie in our natural history, not outside it. It is sympathy,
“the tendency, so strongly developed in man, to reproduce in
himself actions and feelings similar to, or correlated with,
those of other men” (Huxley 1989, 86), that provided the
germ from which our morality grew. The “organized and
personified sympathy we call conscience” (Huxley 1989, 88)
is based ultimately on this reflex. I can only assume that de
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Waal never read this far. Although he does quote from the
beginning of the “Prolegomena,” he does not mention this
part of Huxley’s argument. De Waal’s own candidate moral
core, however, is the spitting image of Huxley’s sympathy: a
reflexlike ability to mimic the behavior and feelings of others
that he calls “empathy.” Astounding indeed.
Where Huxley and many before and after him went wrong
was in depicting nature uniquely as a source of evil. De Waal’s
work on primate social life over the past three decades has
been crucial in demolishing this view. Nature is no more
essentially amoral than human culture is all sweetness and
light. The many observations of and experiments with chim-
panzees and capuchins that de Waal relates put to rest the
view that we are alone in having a sense of fairness, valuing
reconciliation, or helping the needy. De Waal’s argument that
such behavior, in primates or in people, requires an automatic
empathic mechanism is plausible. But here, as elsewhere (e.g.,
de Waal 2001), he combines this demonstration of the con-
tinuities between ape and human with a stubborn refusal to
allow even a hint of discontinuity. In his anti-dualism, de
Waal is caught in a dualism of his own. Like many proponents
of evolutionary approaches to human behavior (Derksen
2005), he sees only one alternative to dualism: monism.
As Philip Kitcher notes, de Waal is very clear about the
starting point of our morality but seems unwilling to think
much about its terminus. Both Christine Korsgaard and
Kitcher urge a consideration of what is specific about human
morality, and both identify this in normative self-government,
precisely the capacity that Huxley saw as central to the ethical
process. We are, as Huxley put it in a famous metaphor,
gardeners, cultivating our own nature. We do not merely have
a nature; we are expected to make something of it (Derksen
2007). What enables this reflexivity, according to both Kors-
gaard and Kitcher, is language, with which we can express
our morality in ideal norms. Without leaving the realm of
nature, we can turn back on it.
De Waal does not like the gardening metaphor, because it
suggests that we have to go against nature to be moral. Instead
of going against the grain, like Huxley’s gardener, “we rely
on natural growth” to develop our morality (p. 57). But surely
this is too simple a view. Moral development, whether of
individuals or of society, involves much discussion and re-
flection. It is not simply pushed by natural causes; it is also
guided by goals and ideas that are matters of debate. More-
over, sometimes the process requires self-control. Huxley
seems to have held a rather repressive view of both gardening
and ethics, but he was right that we sometimes check our
impulses and control our desires in favor of a greater good.
None of this implies that morality is not natural or that hu-
man nature is amoral. It implies, as Huxley realized, that one
part of our nature can be antagonistic to another. If that seems
logically absurd, he added, “I’m sorry for logic” (Huxley 1989,
70). Huxley inflated this antagonism to metaphysical pro-
portions, but de Waal’s monism is equally dogmatic. Huxley’s
“horticultural process” of self-cultivation is worthy of the
same kind of detailed empirical attention as de Waal’s primate
studies.
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Frans de Waal is brave. A book about morality in animals
may have been long overdue and may have been presaged by
numerous scholarly works and empirical findings, several by
de Waal himself, but Primates and Philosophers is still a fun-
damental deviation from many cultural and philosophical
convictions. After the Galilean rejection of geocentrism, the
Darwinian rejection of homocentric design, and the Freudian
emphasis on the libidinal roots of humanity (Brown 1961),
one could imagine that by the twenty-first century man’s place
in the universe had come to be regarded as undeniably pe-
ripheral. Morality, however, is somehow still considered to be
of particularly human provenance.
De Waal makes a strong case for the evolutionary continuity
of morality, arguing against both what he calls “Veneer The-
ory” and “anthropodenial” (the unjustified refusal to contem-
plate similarities between humans and other animals).
Whether or not the reader agrees with his thesis, Primates
and Philosophers has some lovely insights into moral actions
in primates and very useful conceptual distinctions between
aspects of moral behavior. The book is thought-provoking
for the lay reader, challenging to the psychologist or philos-
opher, and a helpful repository of arguments for students.
De Waal’s challenge to veneer theory is unequivocal: hu-
mans are naturally good, our goodness inherited from our
nonhuman ancestors and derived (in evolution) from emo-
tional responses that are common to humans and many non-
humans. He seeks to bridge a human-nonhuman divide and,
simultaneously, to bring emotion to the center of the moral
agenda.
De Waal defines morality as the impartial; anything that
involves the interest of the self is seen as not really moral (p.
20):
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emotions such as gratitude and resentment directly concern
one’s own interests—how one has been treated or how one
wishes to be treated—hence they are too egocentric to be
moral. Moral emotions ought to be disconnected from one’s
immediate situation: they deal with good and bad at a more
abstract, disinterested level. It is only when we make general
judgements of how anyone ought to be treated that we can
begin to speak of moral approval and disapproval. It is in
this specific area, famously symbolized by Smith’s (1937
[1759]) “impartial spectator,” that humans seem to go rad-
ically further than other primates.
There is no doubt that this distinction touches on something
that we all recognize and value. Impartiality in the face of
threat is the essence of heroism. So why not insist on im-
partiality as the essence (if we must have an essence) of
morality?
Yet there are two dangers in this definition. First, by pitting
emotion against principle one may fall into an emotion-
morality opposition that de Waal is committed to defeating.
Second, one may invite an evolutionary dichotomy between
species, precisely the opposite of the Darwinian emphasis on
continuity that de Waal vociferously argues for. As a conse-
quence, de Waal has to draw a conceptual distinction between
emotional morality and cognitive morality and thus just as
insuperable an evolutionary distinction between apes and
monkeys as had previously been drawn between humans and
all other animals. These distinctions are standard in current
psychology and have impeccable pedigrees (and well-estab-
lished challenges, e.g., Gilligan 1977). But there is as much
reason to be suspicious of the Platonic divide between cog-
nition and emotion as there is to be wary of yet another
Rubicon dividing species in evolution or stages in ontogeny.
How, then, does one deal with this tension between the
partial and the impartial? John Dewey (1961 [1916], 502)
expressed this relation rather neatly:
One wholly indifferent to the outcome does not follow or
think about what is happening at all. From this dependence
of the act of thinking upon a sense of sharing in the con-
sequences of what goes on, flows one of the chief paradoxes
of thought. Born in partiality, in order to achieve its tasks
it must achieve a certain detached impartiality.
The really difficult question (for psychology at least) concerns
not the relative prominence of partiality and impartiality but
rather how to manage the relation between them. Do we
overcome partiality and dismiss it, or should there be a bal-
ance? Can impartiality ever be genuine if there is no partiality
to give it meaning and value? Similarly, the balance between
engagement and detachment is also problematic in the de-
velopment of social cognition: without engagement, detached
“theory” has no meaning, and without detachment, engage-
ment has no capacity to name. The issue, in relation to mo-
rality, is this: if we cannot assume a one-directional movement
from partiality to impartiality, perhaps we should be looking
not only for continuity but also for simultaneity (and balance
between the two) in evolution.
Most of the objections from the commentators in Primates
and Philosophers are, in fact, that de Waal’s distinctions do
not go far enough or sufficiently recognize the uniqueness of
human morality. The idea of normative self-government—of
choice according to principles or norms—keeps emerging as
a defining feature of what we might choose to call “moral.”
Christine Korsgaard, for instance, skillfully distinguishes be-
tween actions that happen to be moral and those that are
intended to be moral, choosing good because it is known to
be good (p. 112):
We do not merely have intentions, good or bad. We assess
and adopt them. We have the capacity for normative self-
government, or, as Kant called it, “autonomy.” It is at this
level that morality emerges. The morality of your action is
not a function of the content of your intentions. It is a
function of the exercise of normative self-government.
The prerequisite is self-consciousness and skill at conceptual
objectification, that is, knowing not just how but that one is
to be moral. To this extent, the argument is wholly cognitivist:
the essence of morality lies in thinking morally, not in doing
or feeling so. The emphasis on cognition over emotional and
motivated action is as theoretically problematic in discussions
about morality as it is in discussions about social intelligence
(Reddy 2007): for both evolution and development, if intel-
ligence matters, it can only really matter in action (Baldwin
1909; Dewey 1910). The danger of exclusive reliance on moral
cognition or the principles underlying action is particularly
evident in moral self-deception (Wilson, n.d.).
Even though arguments against de Waal’s “veneer” ter-
minology—Philip Kitcher argues that it is too easy a position
to demolish, and Korsgaard hints that it is too neglectful of
the distinctive and un-veneerlike way of being in the world
that human action gives us—are serious and important, they
do not diminish the value of his contribution. In using this
metaphor, however flawed, he has struck an empirical blow
for process in the development of psychological phenomena
and a conceptual one against our penchant for simplistic
dichotomization.
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Gremlin, a female chimpanzee in Tanzania, was cradling her
newborn baby in the company of several other females when
some ugly behavior broke out. Fifi, a community matriarch,
tried repeatedly to snatch Gremlin’s infant from her. Gremlin
moved nervously away, and Fifi began to recruit the assistance
of the other females, anxiously pulling them into the action.
At one point, Gremlin fended off three females—with whom
she had lived side by side for decades—as they attempted to
take her infant away. In chimpanzee society, this could have
only one meaning: an attempted infanticide. The attempts
failed that day, but they raise not only behavioral questions
in need of functional explanation but also philosophical issues
about the meaning of bad behavior.
One approach would be to say that the concept of “bad”
cannot be projected onto a nonhuman animal. Two male
chimps who cooperate to kill a rival are not behaving “badly,”
nor is a female who tries to kill the offspring of her rival,
perhaps reducing food and reproductive competition for her-
self. Self-serving behavior is fundamental to all social organ-
isms, including ourselves, at least according to the Darwinian
paradigm. Yet we humans spend the majority of the hours of
our lives doing things that benefit others. This paradox has
occupied philosophers for centuries, and more recently ani-
mal behaviorists have joined the debate. Frans de Waal’s Pri-
mates and Philosophers follows from his masterful works on
the evolutionary roots of morality, such as Good Natured
(1996) and Peacemaking Among Primates (1989).
Primates and Philosophers is both more and less than ad-
vertised. Although it is de Waal, the most eloquent writer
about primate behavior today, whose name appears on the
cover, the book is really an edited volume in Current An-
thropology format. De Waal’s discussion of the roots of mo-
rality occupies the first half, four commentators—three phi-
losophers (Christine Korsgaard, Philip Kitcher, and Peter
Singer) and an evolutionary psychologist (Robert Wright)—
take aim at his idea, and de Waal replies. Both de Waal and
his critics accept the evolutionary paradigm and the objective
reality of altruism and selfishness, that is, morality.
The essence of de Waal’s argument is that “Veneer Theory,”
the notion that moral behavior in humans is a thin veneer
overlying a core of immorality or amorality, is an intellectual
myth. The targets in much of his essay are Hobbes and Huxley,
who argued that humans are by nature not given to acts of
altruism. De Waal argues, by contrast, that humans are by
nature “good,” in the sense that altruism is a fundamental
and evolved part of our biology. Nonhuman animals, such
as great apes, have a less well-developed but nonetheless real
basis for morality that can be revealed with cleverly designed
behavioral experiments, some of which de Waal details.
The core of the argument should be whether we are an-
thropomorphizing when we apply human concepts of mo-
rality to nonhuman animals. De Waal has argued persuasively
that to deny the foundations of morality to nonhuman ani-
mals is to live in “anthropodenial.” Certainly, the intellectual
stance concerning morality in animals has come full circle,
from an a priori assumption of amorality to one of morality,
at least among our closest animal kin. Despite de Waal’s ve-
hemence, however, the question remains whether we can truly
judge a chimpanzee’s act of wanton violence against a group-
mate to be immoral or, at a purely functional level, amoral.
All four commentators agree that de Waal is wrong about
morality to the extent that nonhuman animals cannot be
considered moral beings. Two (Kitcher and Korsgaard) argue
that animals are “wantons,” lacking mechanisms that could
discriminate among their various motivations. I would agree
with those who argue that even our closest kin either are
amoral in the human sense or at least do not exhibit any
brand of moral behavior that animal behaviorists have been
able to study effectively. When the Gombe male chimpanzee
Frodo attacked and killed a human child in 2002, there was
an immediate understanding by all concerned—except per-
haps the victim’s family—that Frodo’s actions could not be
considered immoral. He was just being a male chimpanzee,
a predator who finds small, helpless mammals tasty and easy
targets. Extending human concepts of morality to nonhuman
animals and then using those same animals to study human
morality may be circular to the point of being sketchy science.
Primates and Philosophers is an excellent book, well worth
assigning in a seminar on the evolution of human or non-
human primate behavior. However, underlying the discussion
of the evolution of morality both here and elsewhere is the
false premise that bad behavior is rife in the human species.
That is true only for those who watch too much television
news or read too many tabloid newspapers. Anthropologists,
of all people, should be attuned to the fact that the goodness-
evil debate is a straw man. The minute-to-minute experience
of living in society tells us that people behave kindly toward
one another in 99.9% of all human interactions. We obsess
about the other 0.1%, albeit they include war and genocide
as well as random acts of violence. The real question is why,
in a life of such nearly constant goodness, the rare act of evil
bursts forth.
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According to a long-standing prejudice in Western philoso-
phy, only human beings are capable of political community
and morality because humans are the only living beings that
possess the capacities for reason and language. This sense of
human uniqueness and moral superiority over nonhuman
animals has always had its opponents. But criticism of the
conventional wisdom gained significant philosophical pur-
chase only with the writings of Charles Darwin, who argued
not only that human beings are animals that share an evo-
lutionary background with all living things but also that mo-
rality itself is an outgrowth of evolutionary processes. Frans
de Waal is one of a number of contemporary thinkers who
have sought to draw out the implications of evolutionary
theory for our understanding of the nature and origins of
morality. In Primates and Philosophers, de Waal marshals re-
cent ethological research to support his contention that mo-
rality is not unique to human beings. De Waal acknowledges
that only human beings have “moral systems” (p. 54), but he
sees signs of moral behavior in several animal species. De
Waal develops his argument by criticizing what he calls “Ve-
neer Theory,” according to which human beings are naturally
selfish and hostile and become moral beings only through a
departure from this natural condition. De Waal argues that
veneer theory is incapable of explaining how morality orig-
inated and that veneer theory is contradicted by ethological
evidence of sympathy and even empathy in some nonhuman
species (chiefly some higher primates). Two of the essential
building blocks of morality are empathy and a sense of rec-
iprocity, and both are found in some higher primates. At its
worst extreme, veneer theory presents “morality as a sham so
convoluted that only one species—ours—is capable of it. This
view has no basis in fact, and as such stands in the way of a
full understanding of how we became moral” (p. 21).
Veneer theory takes as its starting point a Hobbesian view
of human beings as fundamentally selfish and as being forced
to accept social cooperation as a compromise solution in-
tended to mitigate the constant threat of violence and death
with which human beings are supposedly confronted in their
natural state. As implausible as veneer theory might seem—
Christine Korsgaard, one of de Waal’s respondents, dismisses
it as “rather silly” (p. 103)—de Waal observes that it “has
dominated evolutionary writing for three decades” (p. 177).
De Waal notes two interrelated problems with this account
of the advent of social cooperation and morality. First, in
seeing “people as essentially evil and selfish . . . the theory
lacks any sort of explanation of how we moved from being
amoral animals to moral beings” (p. 52). Second, veneer the-
ory fails to acknowledge that “morality [is] a direct outgrowth
of the social instincts that we share with other animals” (p.
6).
On de Waal’s view, what is needed is a theory that avoids
these problems by characterizing human morality as a product
of evolutionary forces. Only such a theory acknowledges the
fundamental connections between human morality and a va-
riety of social phenomena observed in animals, particularly
in monkeys and apes. Thus, for example, chimpanzees will
sometimes console a conspecific who has been defeated in a
fight with a rival (pp. 33–34); chimpanzees, dolphins, and
elephants engage in “targeted helping,” which appears to show
that they can understand the intentions of others (pp. 31–33);
chimpanzees take part in “partner-specific reciprocal ex-
change,” in which individuals are more likely to render as-
sistance to those who have helped them in the past (p. 43);
and capuchin monkeys exhibit a limited, egocentric “sense of
fairness,” that is, “they [show] an expectation about how they
themselves should be treated, not about how everybody
around them should be treated” (pp. 48–49). The more we
acknowledge the presence of such capacities and reactions in
nonhuman species, the less resistance we should feel to the
proposition that the social sentiments that lie at the core of
morality are not unique to human beings. The origin of mo-
rality is not some inexplicable departure from tendencies we
share with nonhuman animals but rather the imperative to
survive and the evolutionary advantage afforded by group
cooperation. “A viable moral system” is generally in “touch
with the biological imperatives of survival and reproduction,”
and its proper goal is “to promote cooperation and harmony”
(pp. 162–63).
Where veneer theory sees morality as a sharp departure
from nature, de Waal argues that morality is a natural response
to natural exigencies. In effect, de Waal conceives of morality
as evolutionary utilitarianism. In doing so, he implicitly rejects
an alternative view: that morality is not the direct product of
evolutionary forces even though it is the product of human
capacities that developed in accordance with evolutionary
forces. On this alternative view, human beings share social
instincts with a number of other animal species but differ
from other species in possessing the autonomy made possible
by the evolutionary emergence of reason and language; once
this space of autonomy emerged, it opened up the prospect
of developing ways of being in the world that do not nec-
essarily serve biological imperatives. Living (or striving to live)
in accordance with a universal moral standpoint according
to which all human beings (or perhaps all sentient beings)
have equal inherent moral worth would be one such way of
being in the world.
Several of de Waal’s respondents in Primates and Philoso-
phers touch on this alternative possibility. Korsgaard stresses
that autonomy is a uniquely human capacity; whereas non-
human animals are determined by their affective states, hu-
man beings are capable of evaluating their desires and making
rational judgments that there are good reasons to act on cer-
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tain desires rather than others. Philip Kitcher acknowledges
that animals are capable of first-order psychological altruism,
that is, “some ability to adjust [their] desires and intentions
to the perceived wishes or needs of others” (p. 132). But he
argues that morality involves much more than this. Whereas
animals can express concern only for local conspecifics, hu-
mans possess the capacity for reflection on a variety of view-
points; this gives rise to the standpoint of impartiality and
“the genuinely moral sentiments” that make us value “what
is ‘useful and agreeable’ to people” in general (pp. 132–33).
De Waal is to be lauded for his criticism of “anthropo-
denial,” the “a priori rejection of shared characteristics be-
tween humans and animals” (p. 65). But he goes too far in
the opposite direction in assuming that morality is a direct
product of evolution and must offer specifically evolutionary
advantages. Why insist that morality be fully explicable in
evolutionary, which is to say scientific, terms? Such a view
threatens to reduce human autonomy to a sophisticated form
of deterministic animal desire, and it begs the questions how
and why human beings ever became able to adopt the uni-
versal, impartial standpoint that makes possible concern for
humanity as a whole and perhaps for animals as well. De Waal
himself asserts that we should have some moral concern for
animals (p. 78). But he explains neither what sort of evolu-
tionary advantage is afforded by the establishment of an im-
partial moral standpoint nor how concern for nonhuman
animals could grow out of concern for our fellow human
beings. As respondent Peter Singer argues, our concern for
impartial judgments and our moral way of being in the world
are not products of our evolved nature (p. 144). In advocating
moral concern for nonhuman animals, de Waal highlights, if
only against his own intention, the limits of evolutionary
theory.
Shirley C. Strum
Department of Anthropology, University of California, San
Diego, La Jolla, CA 92003-0532, U.S.A. (sstrum@
africaonline.co.ke). 7 XI 07
In Primates and Philosophers, Frans de Waal explores the evo-
lutionary origins of human morality in animals, particularly
nonhuman primates, from the vantage point of a historical
and philosophical dichotomy: humans are either evil or good.
If we are evil, human morality is a thin veneer on the surface
(“Veneer Theory”). If we are good, human morality is an
evolutionary outgrowth of “social instincts” with embedded
precursors. De Waal enumerates several foundation blocks for
human morality but anchors his origin story in the percep-
tion-action mechanism, specifically focusing on empathy. He
admits that his theoretical framework is made up of bits and
pieces struggling toward integration. The foundations of mo-
rality, according to de Waal, are kin selection, reciprocal al-
truism, reputation building, principles of fairness, empathy,
and conflict resolution (p. 53). They are forged in in-group/
out-group dynamics and possibly even reinforced by warfare
(p. 55). Even though morality has nonhuman origins, de Waal
emphasizes that the unique aspects of human morality, which
revolve around the community as a whole, required a jump
from interpersonal relations to a focus on the greater good
through the addition of disinterested concern for others (p.
49), taking “the entire community into account” (p. 54).
I agree with de Waal’s evolutionary approach, which ad-
vocates continuity between human and nonhuman primates.
The transition from the nonhuman to the human condition
is pure speculation, but I would add several factors to his list.
Just as he uses examples from chimpanzees and capuchin
monkeys, I use baboons.
Social norms do exist in baboons; they are first socially
enacted and then individually appropriated. To see how this
happens, one must shift the frame from high-level cognitive
accomplishments to performative society (Strum and Latour
1987). Baboons tell their “ought” stories with their bodies
and their interactions, reinforcing and adjusting to social
norms through actions. Two examples illustrate my point.
One social norm is that one should not frighten infants. When
a new immigrant male scares a baby, the troop mobs him.
After that, he adjusts his behavior or is mobbed again. This
“ought” is the foundation for a social strategy called “agonistic
buffering” (Strum 1983), whereby a male uses an infant to
turn off the aggression of an opponent. Baboon friendships
are the other example (Strum 1982, 1983; Smuts 1985). Such
relationships are created, or “performed,” and depend on
subtle adjustments of expectations of exchange, including
grooming, protection from aggressive group members, and
sexual cooperation. Friendships between adult males and fe-
males can be initiated by either, and the friendship process
has “oughts”: what a male should do and what a female should
do. Conformity with expectations creates and maintains the
friendship; violations prevent or destroy it.
Thus, baboons with merely a theory of behavior, some
social norms, and their bodies create a series of social con-
tracts based on the Golden Rule: do unto some others as you
would have some others do unto you. But how? Vygotsky
(1978; also Wertsch 1985) suggests that, in a performative
society, problems are solved in social interaction before being
appropriated by individuals; the flow of cognitive solutions
goes from the social to the individual rather than the other
way around.
Empathy plays a pivotal role in de Waal’s evolutionary
story. Empathy concerns “all processes leading to related emo-
tional states in subject and object” (p. 38). The route to hu-
man morality is from empathy to sympathy, from automatic
“emotional contagion” to cognitive empathy to “attribution”
of the perspective of the “other.” Relying on empathy creates
problems, however. First, empathy requires cognitive sophis-
tication, which seriously constrains the circumstances under
which morality might evolve. The second problem is the po-
sition of empathy, as an emotion, in the evolution of human
morality. We know little about the role of emotions in be-
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havior because emotions were a taboo topic for behaviorism
and classical ethology (Strum and Fedigan 2000). From an
evolutionary perspective, however, emotions can be glossed
as mechanisms that make an individual want to do what was
evolutionarily important to do in the past. Emotions become
quick substitutes for evolutionary calculus. Thus, when co-
operation, sharing, or reciprocity becomes an important be-
havioral adaptation, emotions develop as consequences rather
than causes in the evolutionary process; only later do they
motivate appropriate behavior. Gut reactions about trust, fair-
ness, and even punishment (Nowak, Page, and Sigmund 2000;
Henrich et al. 2004; Haidt 2007) develop in this context. The
precursors of these complex social emotions should precede
empathy as well.
Humans have extended moral consideration well beyond
self, family, and tribe. The evolution of ethics incorporates
region, nation, race, and all humans. We are currently strug-
gling to include some animals and plants, and Nash (1989)
predicts that the trend will extend moral action to the rest of
life, rocks, ecosystems, and the planet. This evolution is based
not on the extension of empathy but on the expansion of our
interaction networks in human performative society. Empathy
can motivate people to act in some cases, such as animal
rights, but not in many others. Many environmental ethicists
have observed that only after behavior changes do humans
rationalize their actions by developing moral arguments.
So how do we get from from animal to human morality?
I disagree with de Waal’s framing of arguments in such terms
as “good-natured” or “bad-natured.” Such dichotomies may
be useful in philosophical discourse, but in today’s science
they are not. Humans have always had a complex combination
of options. Then new aspects of adaptation made a more
developed morality both possible and necessary. At minimum,
the preconditions for this morality would have included re-
sources that could be shared and a lifestyle that puts a pre-
mium on cooperation. In addition, only humans can mo-
nopolize key resources and deny to others what they need for
survival. There are no monkey despots, despite the current
scientific jargon. The possibility of actions precedes the evo-
lution of emotions and mind. De Waal suggests that the high-
est principle of human morality is disinterested moral fairness,
a focus on the greater good. There may be several routes to
this end, including group selection, which now appears to be
particularly applicable to humans (e.g., Richerson and Boyd
2005).
The dialogue on human morality between de Waal and the
four philosophers highlights a historical reality. Formal West-
ern philosophy began as the science of the Classical world
and was a great improvement on mere opinion (Osborne
2007). Today’s science benefits from powerful new theories
and methods and a previously unimagined wealth of empirical
data. But philosophy’s long tradition of cogent and robust
argumentation can contribute to the final step in any science:
the best way to interpret results. The philosophers in this
book give scientists a lot to think about as we venture into
speculation.
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What are the foundations of human morality? Frans de Waal
addresses this question in Primates and Philosophers, based
on his Tanner Lectures on Human Values from 2003. He
draws on rich examples of primate behavior, most of which
he has described eloquently in his other work, especially Good
Natured (1996). However, a new feature of this book is its
succinctness. The examples are lined up to attack a single
target, which de Waal calls “Veneer Theory,” the idea that
morality is a thin veneer covering an amoral or immoral core
inherited from our evolutionary ancestors. From this per-
spective, morality is an achievement of cultural processes that
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keep our evil side in check. De Waal argues that morality is
not a cultural overlay but an outgrowth of instincts that we
share with other primates. He therefore emphasizes the con-
tinuity between the social behavior of other primates and the
moral behavior of humans, exemplified by empathic re-
sponses to the plight of others and reciprocal exchanges of
commodities. He attributes veneer theory to thinkers from
Hobbes through Huxley to Dawkins and claims origins for
his alternative approach in the works of Hume, Darwin, and
Westermarck.
De Waal devotes the second part of the book to empirical
evidence in favor of his naturalistic view. He consolidates
evidence from apes and monkeys, including anecdotes of an-
imal empathy, systematic observations of consolation behav-
ior, and experiments on reciprocal exchange and fairness.
These examples are intended to challenge veneer theory on
empirical grounds. What is not reflected in the lectures, how-
ever, is that these behavioral phenomena are still hotly debated
among primate researchers and that they give rise to more
questions than conclusions. Accordingly, it is a bit surprising
that in a table summarizing empirical evidence de Waal cites
research that supports his view but enters just one word for
veneer theory: “none.” If the argument is so easy, one must
wonder whether veneer theory as described by de Waal is an
actual opponent.
It is therefore all the more important that four eminent
scholars of morality—Robert Wright, Philip Kitcher, Christine
Korsgaard, and Peter Singer—were given the opportunity to
comment on de Waal’s lectures, provide alternative accounts,
and introduce other conceptual distinctions. These commen-
taries, with a response by de Waal, constitute an exceptional
feature of this book, probably its best. All four commentators
agree that veneer theory in its proposed form must be rejected,
but they also redescribe it in a more elaborate form or in-
troduce crucial distinctions that cut across the divide between
veneer theory and de Waal’s naturalistic approach.
Wright, who opens the discussion, has been classified by
de Waal as an advocate of veneer theory, but he prefers a
compromise label, “naturalistic veneer theory.” Although he
agrees that our morality is not a cultural overlay and that our
moral intuitions are biologically grounded, he highlights the
power of emotions, which do not always operate in favor of
moral behavior: even if we think that our moral judgments
are purely rational, they are often rationalizations of emo-
tional imperatives.
Kitcher is persuaded by de Waal’s examples that nonhuman
primates are capable of psychological altruism, but he regards
as crucial the question of what kinds of altruistic dispositions
those primates possess. In particular, he cautions that attrib-
uting some altruistic dispositions to animals is not the same
as saying that they act morally. Dispositions such as sympathy
may be necessary for moral behavior, but they are not suf-
ficient and must be distinguished from genuinely moral
sentiments.
Korsgaard argues that the core of morality is basing our
actions on normative moral judgments, that is, on reasoning
about what one ought to do. She therefore sees more dis-
continuity than continuity between the social behavior of an-
imals—governed by desire, emotion, and altruistic instincts—
and the human-specific ability to subjugate one’s actions to
general normative principles. Thus, like Kitcher, Korsgaard
shifts the focus from the question of whether human nature
is moral to the core characteristics of morality itself.
Singer is sympathetic to the rejection of veneer theory as
portrayed in the lectures, but he thinks that more weight
should be given to the differences between humans and other
animals. He advocates investigating how much of human
moral conduct originates in culture and how much is due to
our evolved nature. He emphasizes that it is a crucial step
from a “morality” based on reciprocity or empathic concern
with one’s own group—which de Waal sees as characteristic
of the social life of nonhuman primates—to a genuine mo-
rality that reaches beyond the group. Expanding the circle of
morality in this way is an accomplishment of human history
rather than of the evolved nature shared with our primate
relatives.
In the last part of the book, de Waal not only responds to
these comments but uses them to develop a stratified model
of human morality that highlights both similarities and dif-
ferences between humans and other animals. The first level
consists of moral sentiments, such as empathy, that can be
found in both humans and other primates and serve as the
building blocks of morality. On the second level de Waal places
processes of social pressure that strengthen social cohesion.
He attributes community concern to nonhuman primates
who, for example, try to restore peace after conflicts between
other individuals. He concedes that in primates these behav-
iors are still egocentric, closely tied to immediate conse-
quences for the individual and “less concerned with the goals
of society as a whole” (p. 168). This is a striking difference
from what we find in humans, who take concern for the group
much farther. The third level is self-reflective moral reasoning,
and there the similarities between humans and other primates
end: “The desire for an internally consistent framework is
uniquely human. We are the only ones to worry about why
we think what we think” (p. 174).
As a whole, then, de Waal’s book provides us with a frame-
work that identifies the foundation of human morality in the
social instincts of nonhuman primates and guides us all the
way to levels of morality that are unique to humans. It pro-
vides multiple perspectives on the topic of morality and
should therefore become a core text, studied by everyone
interested in primates, philosophers, or both.
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